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Abstract 
Consumer durables markets are often observed to be segmented, with some firms producing highly reliable output 
and offering good warranty deals, while others produce less reliable output and offer less attractive warranties, but 
charge a lower price. The model of this paper defines reliability as the objective probability of product failure, not as 
a characteristic of individual goods. Reliability, thus defined, is treated as a choice variable of the firm. This 
approach to reliability is incorporated into a duopoly model which explains the phenomenon of segmentation 
described above. 
Keywords: consumer durables, reliability 
1. Introduction 
In consumer durables markets, firms are frequently observed to specialise their production and marketing operations 
so as to occupy definite segments of the market. Some may offer highly reliable products to the market, perhaps 
along with valuable warranty arrangements. Other firms may opt for low reliability output, perhaps accompanied by 
less valuable warranties. The former will typically charge higher prices than the latter. Barber and Darrough (1996) 
study the international market for non-luxury cars. Japanese firms market expensive, highly reliable cars with good 
warranty deals while American (or perhaps Italian?) firms specialise in less reliable, less expensive cars with less 
valuable warranties. Production and quality control technologies are more or less common knowledge around the 
world, so this form of specialisation, and the consequent international intra-industry trade in cars, requires some 
explanation other than technological differences. One might appeal to different factor endowments, but for mass 
produced products such as non-luxury cars this seems an implausible approach. 
Epple and Raviv (1979) and Saving (1982) argue that product reliability may be independent of market structure. 
Goering and Read (1995) develop a two-period oligopoly model in which they establish that this independence result 
is true only under very limited conditions, though it generally holds if warranties are legally compelled. Their results 
provide a partial explanation for Avinger’s (1981) empirical findings on product obsolescence in the vacuum tube 
and electric lamp industries.  
A possible theoretical approach to this issue can be found in the product differentiation literature. Models with 
vertically differentiated products have been used to explain intra-industry trade under a number of different market 
structures. For example, Falvey (1981) develops such a model while retaining significant aspects of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework. His approach is to assume that relative factor intensity is the main force 
behind vertical product differentiation. The predicted pattern of trade is consistent with the basic 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson result, i.e. each country exports the quality which uses its relatively abundant factor 
intensively. Shaked and Sutton (1984) analyse vertically differentiated production under oligopoly. They develop a 
three-stage model: firms decide on entry in the first stage, quality in the second stage and price in the third stage. 
Thus the number of firms is endogenous. Intra-industry trade can easily emerge in such models but its pattern is 
dependent upon the distribution of income across trading partners. See also Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995) and 
Lambertini (1997). Choi and Shin (1992) develop a vertical differentiation duopoly model in which all the subgame 
perfect equilibria in pure strategies are asymmetric (one firm setting a high price and high quality and the other a low 
price and low quality). Deneckere and de Palma (1998) develop a model of a vertically differentiated durable goods 
duopoly. In the version of their model with endogenous quality choice it is difficult for the low quality firm to soften 
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competition by lowering the quality of its product. This leads to less vertical differentiation than would arise in a 
market for nondurable goods. 
Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) focus on consumer preferences for new durable goods. Their model is dynamic, 
entailing repeat purchases, rational expectations and persistently heterogeneous consumer tastes. They estimate their 
model using panel data from the US camcorder industry. A similar approach is used by Berry et. al. (1999) to analyse 
trade policy and by Schiraldi (2011) to analyse automobile subsidies. 
The model of this paper is in a similar vein to the product differentiation literature and establishes the existence of an 
asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. However there are some crucially different features. Firstly it offers a 
definition of “reliability” which is sharply distinguished from the notion of “quality” in the existing literature. On 
this new definition, reliability can be thought of as a relatively flexible variable (similar to price or quantity) and 
there is consequently no need for a multi-stage game framework. Secondly it introduces two-dimensions of product 
differentiation, which cannot, therefore, strictly be described as “vertical”. The first dimension is the reliability of the 
firms’ output: the second dimension is the warranty payment which firms can choose to offer to the market. These 
two variables (reliability and warranties) cannot, in equilibrium, be chosen arbitrarily by firms, because they are 
linked by consumers’ behaviour towards risk. 
2. Modelling Reliability 
In the model presented in this paper "reliability" will be defined as "the probability of a consumer durable not 
breaking down within some given time period". The probability referred to here is an objective frequency. For 
example, if a car manufacturer produces 100,000 cars each year and 93,000 do not break down within a given time 
period (say one year) the reliability of these cars is 0.93. It will be assumed that the firm chooses reliability (as 
defined here) by varying the stringency of its quality control procedures. Thus the firm knows for sure that 7,000 of 
its cars will break down within the year, but it neither knows nor cares which 7,000 they will be. Now suppose the 
firm offers a one-year warranty with its cars, promising compensation in the event of a breakdown. In this model the 
firm faces no uncertainty, it knows its revenue and production costs: it knows that there will be 7,000 claims under 
the warranty (though not which customers will make them) and it knows how much it will have to pay out per claim 
(that can either be treated as endogenous or imposed by a regulator). There is therefore no uncertainty about its 
profits. 
Warranties, whether voluntary or legally compelled, have an important bearing on decisions affecting reliability 
because the higher the reliability of a firm's marketed output, the lower the expected warranty costs experienced by 
the firm (ceteris paribus). This connection between warranties and reliability has been apparent to managers for 
some time. Wright (1980), for example, describes events at General Motors: 
"I instituted a programme for testing and repairing faulty cars as they came off the assembly line - and the results 
were phenomenal. It cost about $8 a car, which drove The Fourteenth Floor up the wall. But I figured one way or the 
other we would end up fixing the defects or paying to have them fixed through recall campaigns or dealer warranty 
bills........ The internal quality control audit revealed a 66% improvement in the quality of a Chevrolet coming off the 
assembly line between 1969 and 1973 models. And most important, warranty costs of our new cars were down 
substantially." 
It will be assumed that consumers have no knowledge about individual products but do know the reliability of each 
firm’s output (in the sense defined here). Consumers read Which? magazine or Consumer Reports or obtain 
information on reliability from other sources. Firms will be assumed to have the same (limited) information. This is a 
plausible assumption because it is usually impossible or extremely costly for firms to obtain information on each 
example of its output before it is sold. Firms will be assumed to vary reliability (as defined here), by varying the 
stringency of its quality control procedures. It will be assumed that higher reliability entails higher costs (e.g. rework 
or scrapping costs). Thus, the car manufacturer will be able to reduce (or increase) the number of breakdowns in a 
given time period without knowing (or caring) which vehicles will break down and which will not. It will therefore 
be assumed to know the reliability of its output (as defined here), without knowing individual products will break 
down. 
In this model the firm faces no uncertainty, though this is not true of consumers, who are assumed to be risk averse. 
In consumer durables markets, each consumer typically owns one example of the good, and is thus extremely 
concerned at the prospect of its breaking down. The firm, by contrast, supplies many examples of the good, and may 
well find it profitable to operate a risk-pooling warranty scheme. Under these assumptions there arises a demand, on 
the part of consumers, for insurance. This might, as mentioned above, be provided in the form of a product warranty 
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offered by the firm, or an insurance policy provided jointly with the product. Throughout the paper attention will be 
confined to voluntarily offered warranties or compensation, though the model is readily modified to include legally 
compelled compensation. It could also be modified to cover different degrees of product breakdown, or product 
hazard and safety issues. 
In the model of this paper, consumers’ preferences have three distinct aspects. 
 The consumer’s preference for the good in its un-broken-down state. This varies across consumers and is 
exogenous. 
 The consumer’s degree of risk aversion. For convenience this is assumed constant across consumers and is 
exogenous. 
 The probability of the good not breaking down within some given time period (i.e. the reliability of the 
good). Subjective and objective probabilities are, by definition, identical in this model. It is an essential 
feature of the model that this probability is endogenous (determined by firms’ decisions) and the same for 
all consumers. 
The details of consumers’ utility functions are developed in section 3 of the paper. 
Note that the model developed in this paper differs sharply from that presented in the literature on product quality. 
“Quality” is usually taken to be a characteristic of goods which is such that more is preferred to less, ceteris paribus, 
by all consumers. It is typically assumed that all examples of a good produced by a given firm are of the same quality, 
and that the firm is able to vary this quality (and in so doing to vary its costs). This kind of quality variation could 
come about, for example, by redesigning the product or adopting a different technique of production. Quality is 
therefore typically thought of as a relatively inflexible variable (compared with quantity or price) and is usually 
assumed to be set in an early period in a multi-stage game model. Reliability, as defined here, is rather different. It is 
a feature, not of individual goods, but of the distribution of goods produced by a particular firm, namely the objective 
probability of breakdown not occurring. In contrast to quality, reliability, as defined here, is a relatively flexible 
variable. It can be varied by changing the stringency of quality control procedures, though an increase in reliability 
brought about in this way would entail higher costs, such as rework or scrapping costs.  
The literature on experience goods focuses on asymmetric information. “Nature” dictates all relevant characteristics 
of each good to the supplier before sale, but these are unknown to the consumer at that stage. (E.g. the car’s gear box 
will fall out in the first year.) The supplier’s problem is thus one of signalling. Perhaps by means of advertising, or 
offering a warranty or compensation deal, the supplier of high quality goods seeks to signal his high quality to 
consumers in a credible way. See, for example, Grossman (1981), Milgrom and Roberts (1982, 1986), Kreps and 
Wilson (1982), Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983), and McClure and Spector (1991) for models of this type. 
Signalling models are of use in analysing Akerloff’s (1970) famous lemon seller: he has one car to sell, which he has 
owned for long enough to know all its idiosyncrasies. Potential buyers are ignorant of these and an enforceable 
warranty is impossible; thus the problem really is one of signalling. Such models do not describe well the new car 
market, where: 
1. Car firms have thousands of cars for sale but most buyers want a maximum of one 
2. Consumers read road tests and are well informed about the reliability (in the sense defined above) of each firm’s 
cars 
3. Car firms provide warranties with all their vehicles 
4. “Nature” does not dictate reliability to firms; they can vary this by varying the stringency of their quality control 
procedures 
A standard problem, often assumed away in the literature, is that of moral hazard on the part of consumers. If 
consumers can themselves influence the probability or size of a claim under the warranty, for example by failing to 
take proper care of the good during consumption, then the economic role of warranties may be reduced. See, for 
example McKean (1970), Oi (1973) and Priest (1981). Goering (1997) discusses the problem of moral hazard facing 
a durable goods monopolist. For simplicity moral hazard will be assumed away in this paper. 
It should be noted that the model presented here focuses on reliability and warranties, deliberately suppressing some 
other aspects of consumer durables markets. For example, it is essentially a static model, and is not intended to deal 
with the issue of dynamic consistency in these markets. Moreover, it is a model of symmetric information. In such a 
model nothing can be gained by admitting the possibility of repeat purchasing, since neither side of the market can 
learn anything useful about the other. 
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3. Consumers and Firms 
We consider a consumer durables duopoly (firms indexed by i=1,2) in which consumers can choose to purchase one 
unit from firm 1 or one unit from firm 2 or nothing. Let z represent the number of consumers choosing to purchase 
their one unit. For mathematical convenience take z to be a strictly positive real variable. Each consumer has a 
money budget M and pays a price ݌௜ to firm i (i=1,2). If the consumer durable does not break down within the given 
warranty period the z'th consumer receives a stream of services which she values at ݂ሺݖሻ. Note that ݖ ൐ 0 and 
݂ᇱሺݖሻ ൏ 0. If the good does break down within the warranty period the consumer values the stream of services at 
zero, but the firm makes a voluntary warranty payment of ߚ௜ሺ݅ ൌ 1,2ሻ to her. Costs of writing and enforcing the 
warranty are ignored. Thus the z'th consumer receives income stream: 
x = M - p + f(z)                                   (1) 
if the good does not break down, and 
y = M - p +                                     (2) 
if it does. 
The reliability of output will be defined as in section 2, as the probability (R) of the good not breaking down. 
Consumers are assumed to be risk-averse maximisers of expected utility. Throughout the paper it will be assumed 
(following the discussion of section 2) that consumers are well informed about reliability and hence that their 
subjective probability of the good not breaking down is equal to the objective probability (R).  
The z'th consumer maximises expected utility: 
V = R.U(M - p + f(z)) + (1 - R).U(M - p + )                   (3) 
Note that the model is one of partially endogenous preferences, since R is an endogenous variable. Clearly U'(.) > 0, 
and, to ensure risk aversion, it is assumed that U''(.) < 0 (i.e. the function U(.) is assumed concave). 
Reliability costs are discussed at some length in the management literature (e.g. see Bowbrick, 1992). Groocock 
(1986, p53) points out: 
"Because the products might be defective they must be inspected and tested. This results in appraisal 
costs.....Products may also fail a test or inspection, or may fail in the hands of customers. Failure costs are 
then incurred.......(since the firm) must rework or replace the failed product during manufacturing, or replace 
or repair the product for customers, for example, under warranty."  
The model developed here formalises these costs by assuming that production costs are increasing in the reliability 
(R) of output, and by incorporating warranty costs into the firm's profit-maximising decision. Average and marginal 
production costs, at a given reliability level, will be assumed constant. Note that zj (j = 1,2) is the output of the j’th. 
firm, Rj (j = 1,2) is the reliability of the j’th. firm’s output, j (j = 1,2) is the warranty payment offered by the j’th. 
firm and pj (j = 1,2) is the price charged by the j’th. firm. 
Adopting the assumptions set out above a suitable production cost function is: 
zj.C(Rj), where C'(Rj) > 0 and C''(Rj) > 0 for 0 < Rj < 1.             (5) 
Note that both firms are assumed to have identical production and quality control technologies, and therefore the 
same C(.) function. The number of times that the product breaks down is clearly zj.(1 – Rj), and thus warranty costs 
are given by: 
jzj(1 – Rj)                                     (6) 
Thus each firm maximises profit, given by: 
j = pj.zj – zj.C(Rj) - jzj(1 – Rj)                           (7) 
4. Structure of the Duopoly Model 
Following the discussion of section 2, reliability is treated as a relatively flexible variable, in contrast to “quality” as 
defined in the standard literature. It can therefore be thought of as being chosen simultaneously with warranties and 
prices. There is therefore no need to appeal to a multi-period game approach. In fact the equilibrium concept adopted 
here is “augmented Bertrand equilibrium”; i.e. Nash equilibrium in price, warranty and reliability. For simplicity the 
entry decision is not modelled. By assumption, consumers can purchase one unit from firm 1 or one unit from firm 2, 
or no units: they cannot purchase more than one unit. 
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In the Appendix the first order conditions of these Lagrangians are derived. They, in turn, provide a basis for 
describing the equilibrium, establishing the single crossing property and showing that the voluntary participation 
constraint holds for firm 2. 
Firstly it is easy to establish that consumer z1 is indifferent between the two firms (Appendix, Proposition 1) and that 
the voluntary participation constraint holds for firm 2 (Appendix, Proposition 2). Moreover, the marginal consumers 
of each firm are fully insured (Appendix, Lemmas 1 and 2). Comparing the two firms in duopoly equilibrium yields 
the following results: 
 Firm 1’s output is more reliable than that of firm 2 (Appendix, Proposition 4). 
 Firm 1 offers a higher warranty payment than firm 2 (Appendix, Proposition 3). 
 Firm 1 charges a higher price than firm 2 (Appendix, Proposition 5). 
It remains to establish the single crossing property. This is done in the Appendix, Proposition 6. 
5. Conclusions 
In consumer durable markets firms are often observed to specialise their production, with some firms producing 
highly reliable output and offering good warranty deals, while others produce less reliable output and offer less 
attractive warranties, but charge a lower price. The model developed here offers an explanation of this phenomenon. 
It develops a new definition of reliability as a relatively flexible variable determined endogenously by firms, and 
entailing partially endogenous consumer preferences. The model embodies a plausible cost and information structure 
and introduces two dimensions of product differentiation (reliability and warranties) which, in equilibrium, are 
linked by consumers’ behaviour towards risk.  
It is shown that, even when firms have the same cost functions and face the same demand conditions, there exists an 
asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies in which firms specialise in the manner described above. The model 
provides an explanation of the observed pattern of specialisation in the international car market, an explanation more 
plausible than those based on technology differences or factor abundance.  
The model does not deal with the entry decision of firms, treating their number as given, and it assumes away moral 
hazard. However it could readily be modified to incorporate more than one undesired event, and compulsory as well 
as voluntary warranties, or to cover product hazard and safety issues. 
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Appendix 
This Appendix contains the results discussed in the main text. The approach is to derive and utilise the first-order 
conditions of the Lagrangians given in the main text. 
First define: 
)( 111 zfpMx   and 111  pMy                      (A1) 
The Lagrangian for firm 1 (equation 9 in the main text) can now be written: 
 )()1())(()()1()(
)1()(
2221221111
1111111




pMURzfpMURyURxUR
RzRCzzpL
     (A2) 
We now derive the first-order conditions of this Lagrangian: 
  0)()1()( 111111  yURxURzLp                    (A3) 
0)()1()1( 11111  yURRzL                      (A4) 
  0)()()( 1111111  yUxUzRCzLR                 (A5) 
First we establish: 
Proposition 1. Consumer z1 is indifferent between firms 1 and 2. I.e. the constraint in the Lagrangian of equation 9 
(or A2) holds with equality. 
Proof. Since z1 > 0 by assumption, it follows from (A3) that  > 0. Hence, by complementary slackness, the relevant 
constraint must hold with equality. 
 
It is now straightforward to establish the useful: 
Lemma 1. The marginal consumer of firm 1’s output is fully insured. I.e. y1 = x1, or equivalently, 1 = f(z1). 
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Proof. Equations A3 and A4 yield   0)()( 111  xUyUR . Since R1 > 0, by assumption, and  > 0 (by Proof 
of Proposition 1) it follows that   0)()( 11  xUyU . But, by the assumption of risk averse consumers, (.)U 
< 0. Hence the function (.)U  is invertible. It follows that. y1 = x1, or equivalently, 1 = f(z1), as required. 
Corollary 1. )( 11 RC . 
Proof. Follows from equation (A5) 
 
 
Now define: 
)( 2122 zzfpMx   and 222  pMy                (A6) 
The Lagrangian for firm 2 (equation 10 in the main text) can now be written: 
 )()()1()()1()( 22222222222 MUyURxURRzRCzzpM          (A7) 
We now obtain the first order conditions of this Lagrangian: 
  0)()1()( 222222  yURxURzM p                   (A8) 
0)()1()1( 22222  yURRzM                     (A9) 
 )()()( 2222222 yUxUzRCzM R                   (A10) 
It is now straightforward to establish: 
Proposition 2. The voluntary participation constraint holds for firm 2. I.e. the constraint in the Lagrangian of 
equation 10 (or A7) holds with equality. 
Proof. Equation (A8) yields  since z2 > 0 by assumption. Hence, by complementary slackness, the 
corresponding constraint must hold with equality, as required. 
It is now straightforward to establish the useful: 
Lemma 2. The marginal consumer of firm 2’s output is fully insured. I.e. y2 = x2, or equivalently, 2 = f(z1 + z2). 
Proof. Equation (A9) yields: )( 22 yUz   . Substituting in (A8) gives:  
  0)()( 222  xUyUR . But R2 > 0, by assumption, and > 0, from the proof of Proposition 2. Hence: 
  0)()( 22  xUyU . By the argument of Lemma 1 the function (.)U  is invertible. It follows that. y2 = x2, or 
equivalently, 2 = f(z1 + z2), as required. 
Corollary 1. )( 22 RC 
Proof. Follows from equation (A10) 
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It is now straightforward to compare the two firms in duopoly equilibrium. First we establish: 
Proposition 3. Firm 1 offers a higher warranty payment than firm 2. I.e.  > 2. 
Proof. We have 1 = f(z1) from Lemma 1 and 2 = f(z1 + z2) from Lemma 2. Since (.)f  < 0 by definition, the result 
follows. 
Next we demonstrate: 
Proposition 4. Firm 1’s output is more reliable than that of firm 2. (i.e. R1 > R2). 
Proof. From Lemma 1, Corollary 1 we have: )( 11 RC  and from Lemma 2, Corollary1 we have 
)( 22 RC  But (.)C  > 0 by assumption. Hence the result follows from Proposition 3. 
 
Finally we establish: 
Proposition 5. Firm 1 sets a higher price than firm 2. I.e. p1 > p2. 
Proof. From Proposition 3 we have  
)()( 1211 zVzV                                      (A11) 
From Lemma 1 we can substitute 1 = f(z1) into (A11). This yields: 
))(()1())(())(( 212212211 zzfpMURzfpMURzfpMU   
But )( 21 zzf   < )( 1zf . Noting that (.)U  > 0 and that 0 < R2 < 1, it follows that: 
))(( 11 zfpMU  < ))(( 12 zfpMU   
Again noting that (.)U  > 0, it follows that p1 > p2, as required. 
 
We now establish the single crossing property (property B in section 5 of the main text). 
Proposition 6. The single crossing property holds. 
Proof. First define: 
)()()( 21 zVzVzW                                   (A12) 
Expanding the function W(.) gives: 
W(z) = [R1.U(M – p1 + f(z)) + (1 – R1).U(M – p1 + )] – 
[R2.U(M – p2 + f(z)) + (1 – R2).U(M – p2 + )]                     (A13) 
Now f(z) is monotonically strictly decreasing and R1 > R2 (Proposition 4). Hence, provided f(z) is steep enough, it 
must be the case that W(z) > 0, for low enough z and W(z) < 0, for high enough z. It now remains to establish that 
W(z) is strictly monotonically decreasing, since that would imply the existence of a unique z1 such that W(z1) = 0, the 
required result. Differentiating (A13) yields: 
 ))(())(()()( 2211 zfpMURzfpMURzfzW               (A14) 
But )(zf   < 0 and (.)U  > 0 by assumption. Moreover, p1 > p2 by Proposition 5 and R1 > R2 by Proposition 4. 
Hence the term in square brackets in (A14) must be strictly positive. Hence )(zW  < 0, and the result follows. 
